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Dall Meaglter*
FREEDOM OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION,
PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE EMERGING
RIGHT TO PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AUSTRALIA
ABSTRACT
In recent times Australian courts have demonstrated a willingness to fash ion a
right to personal privacy at common law. The Australian Law Reform
Commission has noted this impOt1ant development and said it was likely to
continue in the absence of legislative action in the area. The aim of this article
is to outline a theoretical framework to underpin and inform the development
of this emerging right - howsoever framed - and the extent to which it is
possible for the law to provide meaningful privacy protection to public
officials under the Constitution.
INTRODUCTION
T he march toward the recognition of a legal right to privacy in Australiaappears inexorable. The law has always afforded some and varyingdegrees of protection to a range of interests that are concerned withunwelcome invasions of privacy. I But recent common law developments
in Australia and abroad centre on the development of a right to personal privacy,
something that it had long been assumed was foreclosed in Australia by earlier
authority.2 In the United Kingdom, for example, the passage of the Human Rights
Act 1998 (UK) was considered the catalyst for the cout1s' renewed interest in, and
sensitivity to, privacy interests.3 In Australia, the High COlllt made it clear in
* Senior Lecturer, School of Law, Deakin University.
In Australia, for example, a range of divergent privacy interests are given protection
by the laws of defamation, trespass and breach of confidence, while personal data is
protected through privacy statutes. See generally David Lindsay, 'Freedom of
Expression, Privacy and the Media in Australia' in Madeleine Colvin (ed),
Developing Key Privacy Rights (2002) 157.
See Jane Doe v Australian Broadcasting COIporation (Ul1l'eported, County C01ll1 of
Victoria, Civil Division, Hampel l, 3 April 2007) ('Jane Doe'); Grosse v PlIl1lis
(2003) Aust Torts Repot1s ~81-706. It had long been considered that Victoria Park
Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479,496 (Latham
Cl), 521 (Evatt J) was authority for the proposition that the common law of Australia
did not recognise a right to personal privacy.
Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, 472 (Lord Hoffman), 480 (Lord Hope); see
generally Gavin Phillipson and Helen Fenwick, 'Breach of Confidence as a Privacy
Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era' (2000) 63 Modern Law Review 660; Rabinder
Singh, 'Privacy and the Media: The Impact of the Human Rights Bill' in Basil
Markesinis (ed), Protecting Privacy (1999) 169.
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Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd4 that it would
countenance - if not positively encourage - flllther common law development in
. I 5prIvacy aw.
Moreover, in its recent discussion paper entitled Review ofAustralian Privacy Law,
the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) noted these common law
developments, and said they were likely to continue in the absence of legislative
action in the area. 6 In this regard, the ALRC favours more robust legal protection of
privacy interests in Australia but considers statute, rather than conunon law, to be
the preferred vehicle for doing SO.7
In any event, as Gummow and Hayne JJ noted in Lenah Meats, 'the disclosure of
private facts and umeasonable intrusion upon seclusion, perhaps come closest to
reflecting a concern for privacy "as a legal principle drawn from the fundamental
value of personal autonomy"'. 8 It is the first of these privacy interests - the
disclosure of private facts and information - that has a clear constitutional
dimension when public officials are involved. The Constitution contains an implied
right that protects the communication on political matters needed to secure the
effective operation of representative and responsible government in Australia
('implied freedom,).9 TIle purpose of this alticle is, then, not to add to the body of
scholarship that has emerged in the aftennath of Lenah Meats as to how - and in
what legal form - a right to privacy ought to be developed in Australia. 10 Instead, I
will consider one important question that law-makers (whether judicial or
parliamentary) must address when they fluther develop this area of law: whether it
is possible (or even desirable) for public officials in Australia to enjoy a light to
personal privacy under the Constitution?
I will do so by considering the position of elected public officials in Pmt I, non-
elected public officials in Palt II and judges in Palt 111. TIle possible intersection
between the implied freedom and the privacy interests of each category of public
officials will be considered first. It win be argued in each case that it is possible
6
9
10
(2001) 208 CLR 199 ('Lenah Meats ').
lbid 248-50, 258 (Gunm10w and Hayne 11); see generally Francis Trindade,
'Possums, Privacy and the Implied Freedom of Communication' (2002) 10 Torts Law
Journal 1.
Australian Law Reform Commission, Review ofAustralian Privacy Law, Discussion
Paper No 72 (2007) [5.64].
Ibid [5.68]-[5.71].
Lenah Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199,256.
Lange v Australian Broadcasting COIporalion (1997) 189 CLR 520,560 (' Lange').
See Megan Richardson, 'Whither Breach of Confidence: A Right of Privacy for
Australia?' (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 381; lillian Caldwell,
'Protecting Privacy Post Lenah: Should the ColiltS Establ ish a New Tort or Develop
Breach of Confidence?' (2003) 26 University of Nell' South Wales Law Journal 90;
Des Butler, 'A Tort of lnvasion of Privacy in Australia?' (2005) 29 Melbourne
University Law Review 339.
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(and desirable) under the Constitution that the private lives of elected and non-
elected public officials in Australia attract meaningful legal protection. I will then
consider four kinds of private information and facts - sexuality, infidelity, health
and drug use - for which there is, in my view, a reasonable expectation of privacy.
However, the media may wish to disclose these SOltS of matters when they concem
public officials, notwithstanding that those involved would rather they remain
private. My aim, therefore, is to develop a theoretical framework that may assist the
developing law of privacy - howsoever framed - in recognising when the 'public
interest' in the disclosure of these private facts and infonnation is constitutionally
required or sufficiently impottant to defeat the reasonable expectation of personal
privacy of public officials.
ELECTED PUBLIC OFFICIALS
In Lenah Meats there was an interesting disagreement between Callinan and Kirby
JJ about whether the American media was right not to disclose publicly the physical
disability of President Franklin D Roosevelt when in office. Kirby J thought that
such restraint - that is, respect for Roosevelt's personal privacy - was probably
'misconceived', as public disclosure 'might well have contributed to more infonned
attitudes to physical impainnent generally.,l t On the other hand, Call inan J thought
that such disclosure would now be inevitable; but there is no doubt (considering the
overall tone of his judgment, which laments the state of modem joumalism and the
invasiveness of the media more generally) that he would consider it an intrusive and
offensive invasion of personal privacy. 12
In any event, what lies at the core of this disagreement is the more fundamental
question of whether our elected public officials can (or ought to) have any legally
protected zones of personal privacy.13 It is a question that Australian lawmakers
must necessarily answer in the development of a legal right to privacy. Moreover,
as the High COUtt alluded to in Lenah Meats, there is a constitutional dimension to
it. 14 In the next part of the atticle, I will explain the nature of that constitutional
issue and then develop an argument as to how I think it ought to be resolved. This
argument seeks to accommodate - if not reconcile - two very different
conceptions of what the Constitution requires in the context of the privacy interests
of elected public officials.
II
I~
13
14
Lenah Meals (200 I) 208 CLR 199,288.
Ibid 336; see 298-309 for Callinan J's version of '[a]n overview of the circumstances
prevailing today'.
See generally Frederick Schauer, 'Can Public Figures Have Private livesT in Ellen
Frankel Paul, Fred 0 Miller Jr and Jeffrey Paul (eds), The RighI 10 Privacy (2000)
293: Basil Makesinis and Nico Nolte, 'Comparative Rights of Privacy of Public
Figures' in Peter Birks (ed). Privacy and Loyally (1997) 113.
Lenah Meals (200 I) 208 CLR 199.220 (Gleeson CJ).
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A The Intersection Between the Constitution and the Privacy
Interests ofElected Public Officials
In its seminal decision in Lange, the High COUlt made it clear that any legislative or
executive action which disproportionately burdens communication necessary for the
effective operation of responsible and representative govenunent guaranteed by the
Constitution is invalid.15 Significantly, it also held that '[o]fnecessity, the common
law must confonll with the Constitution. The development of the conunon law in
Australia CalillOt IUn counter to constitutional imperatives.' 16 The upshot of this
constitutional free speech imperative is that Australian privacy law - whether
based in statute or common law - carulot protect those matters for which there is a
reasonable expectation of ptivacy in circumstances where the effective operation of
constitutional govemment requires they be in the public domain. TIle specific
constitutional question in this context is, then, when the public disclosure of the
sexuality, infidelity, health or dlUg use of an elected public official is mandated by
the implied freedom.
1 The 'all relevant information for voting' argument
One possible argument is that the constitutional imperative of the implied freedom
always requires disclosure of these personal matters regarding elected public
officials in order to facilitate the effective operation of constitutional govemment.
The argument would go something like this: 'the Constitution necessarily protect[s]
that freedom of communication between the people conceming political or
govemment matters which enables the people to exercise a free and infomled
choice as electors.' 17 The implied freedom, therefore, secures' access by the people
to relevant infonnation about the functioning of govenunent in Australia and about
the policies of political patties and candidates for election.' 18 That relevant
infomlation about election candidates - and those already holding office -
includes information about their personal morality and private behaviour which is
needed to enable voters to assess their fitness for public office. It is, therefore,
ahFays in the 'public interest' and constitutionally required that details of the
sexuality, infidelity, health or dlUg use of an election candidate be placed in the
public domain.
This argument - and the conception of the implied freedom that underpins it -
suggests that election candidates effectively waive the presumption of personal
privacy on these matters when they choose to enter the political fray.19 It has, as a
consequence, a clarity in its scope which appeals from a rule of Jaw perspective. It
15
16
17
18
19
Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560.
Ibid 566 (citation omitted).
Ibid 560.
Ibid (emphasis added).
For an argument along these lines see Ian Loveland, 'Privacy and Political Speech' in
Peter Birks (ed), Privacy and Loyalty (1997) 51, 88-9.
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also evinces a robust conullitment to freedom of speech, when it is understood that
the Constitution requires that a right to personal privacy cannot protect from public
disclosure private facts and information conceming candidates for elected office
that may inform the voting choices of the citizenry.
Moreover, this is not simply a case of mobilising constitutional principle to equate
what might happen to be of interest to the public with the 'public interest'. As
Frederick Schauer has argued, 'in a democracy there appears to be a right to base
one's voting decisions on criteria that other people take to be wrong.'20 That is,
there will always be significant and legitimate disagreement amongst the citizenry
as to what personal characteristics of candidates are relevant to their fitness for
holding or retaining elected office. More specifically, in this regard, it seems
undeniable that the voting intentions of some persons wil1 tum on inf0l111ation
regarding the sexuality, infidelity, health or dlUg lISe of an election candidate,
irrespective of their policy platform and otherwise than to satisfy mere curiosity or
a salacious interest. And, notwithstanding the ilTelevance of such criteria for many
other voters, it becomes difficult - if not impossible - for the law to quarantine
the public disclosure of these matters to only those persons for whom it may
relevantly inf0l111 their vote. So it emerges that there are sound reasons in both
policy and principle for the view that the implied freedom may require public
disclosure of private facts and information conceming candidates for public office
in order to facilitate the effective operation of constitutional government. 21
2 The 'informed political discourse' argument
There is, however, another conception of the implied freedom that grounds a
different argument as to how the freedom might infol111 the content and scope of the
privacy rights of elected public officials. This conception posits that a robust and
informed public discourse on political and govel1ullental matters is necessary for
the effective operation of constitutional govel1Ullent. On this view, a privacy rule
that always required public disclosure of the sexuality, infidelity, health or drug use
of an elected public official would in fact have a cOl1'osive effect on the quality of
political discourse. Eric Barendt explains it in the following terms:
[T]he law would in effect deny politicians privacy rights. even to stop the
publication of stories which have no clear relationship to the discharge of their
public duties ... Without protection from privacy laws, sensitive people may
prefer not to enter public life or may leave it, rather than allow themselves and
their family to endure constant tabloid exposure. The media may find it easier
to write abollt personalities and their private life than to explore social issues.
That has already happened in England and the United States. where privacy is
not well protected, but may have happened less on the continent of Europe. in
20
2\
Schauer, above n 13,303.
See Eric Barendt. Freedom ofSpeech (2nd ed. 2005) 232.
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particular France where politicians can claim the protection of strong privacy
laws.n
So weak or non-existent privacy rights for elected public officials - which result
from the first conception of the implied freedom outlined above - may undennine
the quality of political discourse in two ways. First, by dissuading meritorious
candidates from running for public office; and second, by providing flilther
incentive and oppottunity to the media to cover their pt;vate lives at the expense of
providing a public forum to stimulate and critique infonned political discourse and
debate. 23 The operation of these forces may, in time, undenuine the ability of 'the
people to exercise a free and informed choice as electors',24 which is the democratic
right promised - indeed guaranteed - to them by the Constitlltion. On this
argument, then, a t;ght to personal privacy must extend to elected public officials,
at least in some circumstances, to secure the effective operation of constitutional
govemment.
3 A consensus approach
It can be seen that the task of crafting a legal right to personal privacy to ensure its
compatibility with the implied freedom depends on the conception one holds of the
system of representative and responsible government established by the
Constitution. As my preceding analysis demonstrates, it is not simply a matter of
choosing between freedom of political communication on the one hand and the
privacy interests of elected public officials on the other. There is, as noted, a
defensible conception of the implied freedom that considers privacy rights in this
context to enhance, rather than undercut, public discourse on political and
govenunental matters.
Consequently, the development of privacy law in this area requires the law-maker
to decide what is the nature of the theoretical relationship between privacy interests
and the implied freedom. And that decision - what is required for a pl;vacy right
to be compatible with the Constitution - necessm;ly involves making a difficult
value judgment. The methodology employed, for example, by the High COUtt in
24
Ibid 232. See also Lee Bollinger, Images ofa Free Press (1991) 24-7.
I am not suggesting here that all, or even most, pm1s of the print and electronic media
would become tabloids - consider the American experience. However, there is a
likelihood that the most popular Australian newspapers, for example, which are
tabloids would continue to go down this path. The veteran American political
journalist Carl Bemstein recently said: '[t]he elevation of gossip, sensationalism and
manufactured controversy; the values of joumalism are appealing to an ever-
descending common denominator rather than the best attainable version of truth.' See
Tom Allard, 'Truth Beats the Idiot Culture, Says News Sleuth', The Age (Mel-
bourne), 20 November 2007, 4. On the American media experience, see generally
Lenah Meals (2001) 208 CLR 199,306-9 (Callinan J).
Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560.
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Lange to refashion the law of defamation is not obviously transferable to the
privacy context, where the relationship between freedom of political communi-
cation and privacy is arguably more complex and ambivalent. 25
[t may, however, be possible - desirable even - for our law-makers to develop a
right to personal privacy that, if not reconciles, at least seeks to accommodate both
conceptions of the implied freedom and the arguments outlined above. [ will argue
shOitly that this consensus approach is not only constitutionally pennissible, but
may in fact be necessary for a personal privacy right to gain a foothold in the
Australian legal landscape. This is especially so when one considers the intersection
between constitutional free speech and privacy interests in the United States. It is to
that American jurisprudential story that [ will now briefly tum.
(a) The intersection ofthe First Amendment and American privacy law
The pervasiveness of the First Amendment in American constitutional juris-
prudence has, in the opinion of some commentators, undennined - if not gutted -
the ability of their statute and common law to provide for meaningful protection of
personal privacy.26 The putative source of protection is the tOit of invasion of
privacy, which is generally understood to encompass four distinct torts: 27 Intrusion
upon Seclusion;28 Appropriation of Name or Likeness;29 Publicity Given to Private
25
27
28
29
See above n 21, 231-2. As Barendt has noted, the relationship between the privacy
interests of public officials and freedom of speech is complex, and it 'would be
wrong simply to apply the arguments relevant to defamation ... The arguments for
free speech from its role in ensuring effective democracy, and the key importance of
uninhibited public discourse, make that c1ainl hard to resist. Free speech is clearly in
issue. But it is not necessarily a trump card. Otherwise, the law would in effect deny
politicians privacy rights, even to stop the publication of stories which have no clear
relationship to the discharge of their public duties.'
United States Constitution amend I reads: 'Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Govemment for a redress of grievances.' On this point see David
Anderson, 'The Failure of American Privacy Law' in Basil Markesinis (ed),
Protecting Privacy (1999) 139; Jeanne M Hauch. 'Protecting Private Facts in France:
The Warren and Brandeis Tort is Alive and Well and Flourishing in Paris' (1993) 68
Tulane Law Review L219, 1287-90.
See American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Second, Torts (L 977) 376 §
652A.
Ibid 378 § 6528: 'One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concems, is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person.'
Ibid 380 § 652C: 'One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or
likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.'
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Life;30 and Publicity Placing Person in False Light,31 As noted, the High COUlt
considers the first and third tOlts the healtland of personal privacy concems in
Australia, with the most relevant for the purposes of this article being the tOlt of
public disclosure of ptivate information. David Anderson describes that tOlt in the
following terms:
[T]he tOlt of public disclosure of private facts is the only body of law Ihat
purports to give the individual a remedy for unwanted disclosures, and it is the
only direct source of legal restraint on media disclosures of private facts. TIlis
tOlt creates a cause of action for damages against the media or others who
disclose private information that would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person and is not of legitimate public concern. 32
However, in a series of Supreme Court decisions, the talismanic effect of the First
Amendment - in palticular, viewing the constitutional status of privacy through
the lens of the underlying First Amendment rationale of its famous defamation rule
in New York Times Co v Sullivan33 - has, for all practical purposes, 'obliterated,34
the tOlt of public disclosure of ptivate facts. 35 Brennan J's landmark judgment in
New York Times explained that rationale in the following tenus:
The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is
secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions. The
constitutional safeguard, we have said, 'was fashioned to assure unfettered
30
3\
32
33
34
35
Ibid 383 § 652D: 'One who gives publicity to a matter concel11ing the private life of
another is subject to liability to the other for his invasion of privacy, if the matter
publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.'
Ibid 394 § 652E: 'One who gives publicity to a matter concel11ing another that places
the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of
the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.'
Anderson, above n 26, 141.
376 US 254, 279-80 (1964) ('Nell' York Times'). According to Brennan J, '[t]he
constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice" - that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.'
See Florida SIal' v B.J.F., 491 US 524, 550 (1989) (' Florida SIal"): In Florida SIal',
White J wrote in dissent that the Court had accepted the invitation 'to obliterate one
of the most noteworthy legal inventions of the 20th century: the tOlt of the publication
of private facts'.
See Anderson, above n 26, 157-9.
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interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.' ... Thus we consider this case against the background
of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate of public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasant~v sharp affacks on
government and public officials. 36
183
The core of this rationale is to foster - indeed to constitutionally guarantee - the
public discourse required for meaningful self-govemment. 37 Yet the rule in New
York Times moved quickly beyond the capacity of public officials and those
running for public office to recover in defamation. It would apply equally to 'public
figures,38 because the Supreme Cou11, in the words of Wan'en CJ, considered that
'differentiation between "public figures" and "public officials" and adoption of
separate standards of proof for each have no basis in law, logic, or First
Amendment policy. ,39 The logic of this extension of the rule is compelled by a First
Amendment rationale (or policy, as Wal1'en CJ called it) that, if implicated, always
favours - if not requires - publication. This may well be appropriate in the
context of the intersection between constitutional free speech and defamation.
However, the New York Times rule, and the 'publication/disclosure creep' that it
triggered for defamation law more generally, is by no means universally
welcomed."o
In any event, what has proved disastrous for the constitutional status of personal
privacy in the United States is the application of the First Amendment rationale
embodied in the New York Times rule to the tOl1 of public disclosure of private
facts. In a trilogy of privacy cases - Cox Broadcasting Corporation v Cohn,"l
Florida Star"2 and Bartnicki v Vopper"3 - the rationale of New York Times loomed
large and, unsurprisingly, resulted in public disclosure in circumstances where there
were strong, if not compelling, privacy interests at play. In Cox, for example, in
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
376 US 254,269-70 (1964) (Brennan J) (emphasis added).
On this rationale for the First Amendment, see Alexander Meiklejohn, Political
Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People (1965); Alexander Meiklejohn,
'The First Amendment Is an Absolute' [1961] Supreme Court Review 245.
Curtis Publishing Co v BUffs, 388 US 130 (1967); Associated Press v Walker, 389
US 28 (1967).
Curtis Publishing Co v BUffs, 388 US 130,163 (1967).
See Barendt, above n 21, 209-10.
Cox Broadcasting Corporation v Cohn, 420 US 469 (1975) ('Cox'). 1 note here the
factual similarity between this case and the recent Australian case, Jane Doe: both
involved the disclosure by the media of the name of a rape victim during the relevant
criminal trial. The disclosure in Jane Doe was, however, unlawful under statute law
- irrespective of any common law privacy claim.
491 US 524 (1989).
Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 US 514 (2001). There is also a strong factual parallel
between Bartnicki and Lenah Meats: both cases involved the lawful publication of
illegally obtained material.
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finding that the First Amendment prohibited an award of 'damages for [an] invasion
of privacy caused by the publication of the name of a deceased rape victim which
was publicly revealed in cOlmection with the prosecution of the crime' ,44 White J
wrote:
[I]n a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with
which to observe at first hand the operations of his govemment, he relies
necessarily upon the press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of
those operations. Great responsibility is accordingly placed upon the news
media to report fully and accurately the proceedings of govemment, and
official records and documents open to the public are the basic data of
governmental operations. Without the information provided by the press most
of liS and many of 0111' representatives wOllld be unable to vote intelligently or
to register opinions on the administration ofgovernment generally.45
The disclosure logic outlined in Cox - underpinned as it was by the First
Amendment rationale noted above - was taken significantly fwther by the
Supreme Court in Florida Star and Bartnicki. In Florida Star, it was held that if 'a
newspaper lawfully obtains ttuthful infonnation about a matter of public
significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the
infonnation, absent a need to fmther a state interest of the highest order. ,46 The
relevant infonnation was the name of a rape victim located in a police repOlt that
was published at a time when the perpetrator was still at large. It led White J to
write scathingly in dissent that
by holding that protecting a rape victim's right to privacy is not among those
state interests of the highest order, the Coul1 accepts appellant's invitation ...
to obliterate one of the most noteworthy legal inventions of the 20th century:
the tOl1 of the publication of private facts. 47
It was probably ineVitable, then, that in Bartnicki the Supreme COUlt would hold
that the First Amendment prohibited recovery for an invasion of privacy when the
relevant infonnation was 'the repeated intentional disclosure of an illegally
intercepted cellular telephone conversation about a public issue. ,48
My point here is not that decisions in this trilogy of privacy cases were necessarily
wrong - although I must confess to finding the dissent of White J in Florida Star
to be palticularly compelling - but that they were inevitable once the Supreme
COUlt aJticulated its First Amendment rationale in New York Times and then applied
420 US 469, 471 (1975)(White J).
Ibid 491-2 (emphasis added).
49\ US 524, 533 (1989) (Marshall J) (citation omitted).
Ibid 550 (juined in dissent by Rehnquist CJ and O'Connor J).
532 US 514. 517 (2001) (Stevens J).
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it directly to the privacy context.49 That constitutional rationale, as noted, posits that
the animating free speech principle is that 'debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on govemment and public officials. ,50
So, in the event of a clash between the privacy interests of elected public officials
(indeed of persons involved in any matter of public interest and concem) and the
First Amendment, the latter will always prevail and compel the public disclosure of
private facts to conform to that constitutional principle.
(b) The American constitutional experience: lessons for Australian privacy law?
This btief excursus into First Amendment jUlisprudence suggests that a theory of
constitutional free speech that takes no meaningful account of privacy interests
inevitably results in elected public officials enjoying no legally enforceable zones
of personal privacy. And it seems to me that the first conception of the implied
freedom outlined above - where the Constitution would compel the public
disclosure of private facts concerning candidates for elected office to ensure fully
infonned voting choices - is underpinned by a similar logic and understanding of
the relationship between privacy interests and constitutional free speech.
There are, however, important textual and doctrinal differences between the First
Amendment and the implied freedom. Most notably, the fonner is an express and
free-standing right to free speech that provides constitutional protection to a range
of expression extending well beyond 'political' speech or communication. It might
therefore be suggested that, considering the very different constitutional contexts,
the intersection between constitutional free speech and privacy interests in the
United States is less than instructive for the emerging law of privacy in Australia.
But it is wOlth keeping in mind that the First Amendment rationale articulated in
Nell' York Times is similar to the core imperative of the implied freedom: to
guarantee constitutionally the public discourse required for meaningful self-
govel1lment. Once that conception of constitutional free speech took root in First
Amendment jurisprudence, the disclosure logic that it compelled made it almost
impossible for a privacy right to resist it whenever a matter of public interest or
49
50
Moreover, as Anderson. above n 26, 158-9 explains. the nature of the balancing test
which the courts must apply in 'all privacy cases, or at least all that arise from
discussions about matters of public significance' will almost always see
constitutional free speech (resulting in public disclosure) trump privacy interests:
'[p]rivacy in the abstract will not be assumed to be a state interest of the highest
order; rather, the plaintiff must convince the court that the specific privacy interest at
stake in the particular case is of the highest order. And even if the privacy interest is
sufficiently high, the plaintiff will still lose unless the remedy the state has provided
is 'narrowly tailored'. Tort law by its nature is rarely narrowly tailored; it provides
broad-gauge remedies designed to be adapted in a fairly ad hoc way to varying
factual pattems.'
Nell' York Times. 376 US 254. 270 (1964) (Brennan J).
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concem was at play - as the trilogy of American privacy cases clearly
demonstrated.
It is for these reasons that the first conception of the implied freedom ought to be
rejected by Australian lawmakers in the privacy context. The trajectory of
Ametican constitutional free speech and privacy jUlisprudence provides a salutary
lesson for Australian law. That is, that to adopt this conception of the implied
freedom may plant the constitutional seeds of destruction of the nascent right to
personal privacy for elected public officials and a range of other persons besides. 51
However, even if the implied freedom does not always require the public disclosure
of ptivate facts conceming elected public officials, it seems equally clear that it
should not be possible to mobilise a ptivacy tight to keep private such matters when
they are necessary to secure the effective operation of our system of constitutional
govemment. The difficult issue is, therefore, how to frame a privacy rule (or
exception to it) that can take seriously the privacy interests of elected public
officials without offending the Constitution by depriving the citizeruy of
infonnation that is necessary to make informed voting choices.
B The Right to Personal Privacy ofElected Public Officials in Australia
In this part of the at1icle, I will argue that it is possible to frame a rule that provides
meaningful protection to the privacy interests of elected public officials in a manner
that confonns to the Constitution. This mle seeks to accommodate, if not reconcile,
both conceptions of the implied freedom outlined above.
1 The rule
The ALRC has recently proposed the following statutory privacy t0l1:
An invasion of privacy could be determined as made out where:
The plaintiff had, in all the circumstances, a reasonable expectation of privacy
in relation to the relevant conduct or information; and/or
The defendant's invasion of privacy in relation to that conduct or information,
is, in all the circumstances, offensive (or highly offensive) to a person of
ordinary sensibilities. 52
'I See Anderson. above n 26, 157-9.
Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 6, [5.75]. This form of statutory tOl1
was first proposed by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Invasion of
Prim(y. Consultation Paper I (2007) [7.5]. See also Butler, above n 10, 373, where
the author suggests that Australia should adopt the following tort of unreasonable
intrusion upon privacy:
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This kind of ptivacy rule would offer protection for those matters for which I
suggested earlier there is, or at least ought to be, a reasonable expectation of privacy
such as a person's sexuality, infidelity, health and drug use. In doing so, it would
foster the core privacy values of individual autonomy, integrity and the capacity to
develop meaningful family and other intimate relationships so critical to human
flourishing. 53 Moreover, extending this protection to elected public officials has, as
noted, a defensible constitutional justification. But when the public disclosure of
private facts and information conceming elected public officials is necessary for the
citizenry to make infonned voting choices, then a privacy right must yield in these
circumstances to ensure its compatibility with the Constitution. It makes sense to do
so by providing a defence to a general privacy mle.
2 The defence
The ALRC (and others) have identified the impOltance of providing a defence to
those who disclose otherwise legally protected private facts and infonnation when it
is in the 'public interest' that they do SO.54 In this patt of the alticle, my aim is to
outline the rationale and scope of such a defence as it relates to elected public
officials. But before doing so, I want briefly to say something about an important
procedural matter. That is, on whom should the evidentiary and legal burdens for
such a 'public interest' defence fall? I would argue that if the law is to take
seriously the privacy interests of elected public officials then both should fall on the
defendant to a privacy action. Sean Scott has made this argument in the context of
Ametican privacy law where she says that it
should result in expansion of the privacy right. However, it will not threaten
First Amendment values. While an individual's interest in privacy may be at
53
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'l. an intentional intrusion (whether physical or otherwise) upon the situation of
another (whether as to the person or his or her personal affairs) where there is
a reasonable expectation of privacy; and
2. the intrusion would be "highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary
sensibilities", '
See Eric Barendt, 'Privacy as a Constitutional Right and Value' in Peter Birks (ed),
Privacy and Loyalty (1997) 1; Raymond Wacks, Persona/In/ormation: Privacy and
the Law (l989) 7-13.
Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 6, [5.83]. The ALRC note that
defences to a cause of action for invasion of privacy generally include:
'act or conduct was incidental to the exercise of a lawful right of defence of
person or property;
act or conduct was authorised or required by or under law';
disclosure of information was of public interest or was fair comment on a
matter of public interest; or
disclosure of information was, under defamation law, privileged.'
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stake, there are larger societal issues protected by privacy. TIlese societal
values may be the same values protected by the First Amendment,55
These values include the search for truth, the promotion of self-govel1unent and
individual autonomy.56 Scott argues, persuasively in my view, that providing the
citizenry with meaningful privacy protection 'encourages people to come forward
and engage in the [public] debate.'57 TIus may 'motivate the public to leam about
issues and to engage in meaningful dialogue concenung them. This engagement
promotes the search for truth, and encourages an informed rather than an ignorant
public.'58 ImpOltantly, this view is consistent with the 'infol1ned political discourse'
argument outlined above in the context of the Constitution, and provides a
principled justification for placing these burdens on the defendant in the context of
Australian privacy law.
In any event, a 'public interest' defence in this context must also, as noted, conform
to the constitutional imperative of the implied freedom. It is my argument that there
are at least two contexts in which private matters such as the sexuality, infidelity,
health or drug use of an elected public official are clearly relevant in this
constitutional sense. They are when the private facts and infol1nation disclosed (or
sought to be disclosed) would compromise, undermine or contradict the integJity of
the public official's stated policy agenda or may impact negatively on the public
official's capacity to properly discharge his or her public duties.
(a) When private/acts and information regarding elected public officials reveal the
insincerity or hypocrisy oftheir policy agenda
The clearest example of this first category is when a politician runs for office on a
palticular policy agenda but his or her private behaviour demonstrates the
insincerity or hypocJisy of that public position. The controversy that engulfed
Conservative UK MP David Ashby in 1995 is a case in point. Ashby, who was
married with a child, had campaigned on a conservative sexual and family values
agenda at a time when, according to the Sunday Times, he was conducting a
homosexual affair with a younger man. 59 The public disclosure of this kind of
marital infidelity is justified, for it demonstrates Ashby's political hypocrisy and
dishonesty to the electorate.
55
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58
59
Sean Scott, 'The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy' (1996) 71 Washington
Law Review 683, 707.
Ibid 708; see generally Barendt, above n 21, 6-21; Raymond Wacks, Pril'ac:v and
Press Freedom (1995) 21-47.
Ibid 710.
Ibid 711 (emphasis added).
For a description of the Ashby affair, see Loveland, above n 19,88-9.
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A more recent example is the controversy surrounding long-tenn Idaho Senator
Lall)' Craig. In August 2007 Craig pleaded guilty to a public disturbance for
allegedly soliciting an undercover police officer for homosexual sex in a toilet at
the Minneapolis airpOlt. In this regard, the events alleged to have occulTed in the
airpolt toilet were put on the public record by Craig's guilty plea. GO But more
impOltantly from a ptivacy perspective, it made fluther, more detailed, revelations
about Craig's homosexual past in a subsequent investigative report by The Idaho
Statesman clearly in the public interest, considering his strident conservative views
and voting record on matters concerning homosexuals. GI
In Australia, public disclosure of these sorts of private facts in similar contexts
would clearly be in the 'public interest', and may indeed be constitutionally
required to secure for the people the free and informed voting right guaranteed by
the implied freedom. It cannot be that ptivacy law keeps from the citizel1l)' private
facts and infonnation concerning public officials that would clearly undermine or
contradict the political agenda that they themselves have advocated in the public
domain to secure or maintain elected office.
(b) When private facts and information regarding elected public officials may
diminish their capacity to discharge their public duties
In my view, the following examples would fall into this category: the prescliption
drug habit of Richard Nixon when President of the United States,G2 and also the
cancer illness of Francois Mitterrand when President of France. G3 Maybe more
controversially, I would also include the extramarital affair of Gareth Evans and
Chel)'l Kernot when the former was a Labor senator and government minister and
the latter the leader of another political palty, the Australian Democrats.64 In my
view, the extramarital status of the affair was not in itself compelling, but the
relationship raised a potential and serious conflict of interest between their public
duties as elected members (and senior members) of different political parties.
Indeed, I think that public disclosure in this instance was warranted irrespective of
the fact that Evans eventually succeeded in recruiting Kemot to the Labor Patty.
That fact, whilst clearly sufficient to justify public disclosure, seemed to me simply
60
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See National Public Radio, 'Senator's SUPP011 Scatters as Arrest Comes to Light', All
Things Considered, 29 August 2007 <http://www.npr.org/templates/ story/stOlyphp?
stOlyld=14033089> at 15 June 2008.
See National Public Radio, 'Newspaper Writes on Senator's Sexuality', All Things
Considered, 28 August 2007 <http://www.npr.org/templates/stoly/stolyphp?stolyld=
14004861> at 15 June 2008.
See Anthony Summers, The Arrogance ofPower: The Secret World ofRichard Nixon
(2000) 316-18, 449-50, 455.
See Barendt, above n 21, 241-2.
'Kemot "Had Affair With Gareth Evans"', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 3 July
2002 <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/07/03/1025667005180.html> at 15 June
2008.
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to underscore the nature of the central conflict of interest, and the fact that it
eventually became manifest. 65
(c) When private facts and information regarding elected public officials may
reflect poorly on their honest and probity: a third disclosure rationale?
There is an argument that the public disclosure of private facts and information
conceming elected public officials is constitutionally required in Australia - and in
the 'public interest', at any rate - if it reflects poorly on their honesty and probity
more generally. The underlying constitutional premise of this argument is that the
people must have access to relevant personal information about 'candidates for
election ,66 in order to make informed voting choices. But the essence of this
argument is largely indistinguishable from the first conception of the implied
freedom ('all relevant infonnation for voting') and the voting cliteria 'right' that
Schauer says exists in a democracy. The upshot, again, would be that the privacy
rights of elected public officials would always be trumped by a constitutional
rationale that compelled public disclosure.
In this regard, consider my categories of private facts and infonnation - sexuality,
infidelity, health and drug use - and when their public disclosure would reflect
poorly on the general honesty and probity of an elected public official. For
example, the only time 1 can think where the 'sexuality' of a candidate for election
would fall into this category is when disclosure would contradict or undermine a
publicly stated position on that policy matter. If so, this scenario is already covered
by my first category. In terms of infidelity, it is in t1lis context that the argument
becomes indistinguishable from the first conception of the implied freedom outlined
earlier, and from Schauer's voting criteria 'right'. It is clear enough that the
infidelity of an election candidate would reflect poorly on his or her general honesty
and probity in the view of many people. But if public disclosure is always justified
in this context - to infonn the voting choices of some members of the public -
then the law is incapable of providing meaningful (indeed any) protection of the
privacy interests of election candidates, as my earlier analysis made clear.
The other two categories are the health or use of drugs by elected public officials. If
either of these private facts would likely diminish their ongoing capacity to properly
discharge their public duties, then public disclosure is already lawful under my
second category. But what about inf01111ation regarding the illicit drug use of an
election candidate in a private social context?67 Or whilst he or she was a university
07
Sec Laurie Oakes. 'Secrets and Lies', The Bulle/in (Sydney), 9 July 2002, 16.
Scc LOllge ( 1997) 189 CLR 520. 560.
Scc: \:lg. Mark Latham. The La/ham Diaries (2005) 320. The author admitted that,
whilst a l'vlcmb\:lr of Parliament. he had smoked a marijuana joint at a corridor party
in 1994 in thc ministerial wing of the Federal Parliament.
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student some years prior?68 These are hard cases. But I would, again, argue that if
the law is to provide elected public officials with some level of privacy protection
then public disclosure is only in the public interest if these matters satisfy either the
'hypocritical policy agenda' or 'diminished capacity' disclosure rationales.
In any event, it seems to me that illicit drug use in a private social context by an
election candidate could, depending on the circumstances, fall into either category.
For example, the second disclosure rationale may be satisfied if an elected public
official has a serious and ongoing drug problem; or a conscious decision to break
the law may betray such a serious lack of political judgment that his or her capacity
to properly discharge his or her public duties must be open to question. Moreover,
the first disclosure rationale is satisfied when a candidate for elected office
campaigns on an anti-drugs agenda. On the other hand, I think illicit drug use in the
past (whilst a university student, for example) could only ever satisfy my first
disclosure rationale. And even then it is only constitutionally relevant, in my view,
if the election candidate campaigns on an anti-drugs agenda and has positively
denied illicit drug use in the past.
Consequently, if a legal right to personal privacy must extend to elected public
officials in at least some circumstances, then this 'honesty-probity' argument, with
one possible qualification, must be rejected as a third rationale to make lawful the
public disclosure of private facts and information for which there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The one qualification in this regard is when the private
matter - such as the illicit drug use of an elected public official - is the subject of
a criminal conviction. As noted regarding Senator LaITy Craig, there is an argument
that this information is already in the public domain, so that it can never be a matter
for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.69 But, maybe more
impOltantly from a constitutional perspective, the fact that an elected public official
has a criminal record must go to the hemt of whether he or she is a fit and proper
person to hold or retain public office.
A criminal record (or guilty plea, for that matter) is also an objective and verifiable
legal fact regarding the criminal activity of an elected public official. It does not
involve a subjective assessment by some members of the public that otherwise
lawful private behaviour (such as infidelity or poor health) reflects poorly on his or
her honesty and probity. This is important, for it suggests that the public disclosure
of a criminal record in this context can also be made without fear that it would
68
69
For example, Liberal Party Senator Nick Minchin admitted to smoking marijuana
whilst at high school and university. See Jessica Irvine, 'Of Course I Inhaled, Says
Finance Minister', Sydney MOl'l1ing Herald (Sydney), 12 July 2007 <http://
www.smh.com.au/news/national/of-course-i-inhaled-says-finance-minister!
2007/07/12/ 1183833608886.html> at 15 June 2008.
See Loveland, above n 19, n 141. The author 'assume[s] (following Monitor Patriot v
Roy, 401 US 265 (1971)) that a politician's criminal activity is always to be regarded
as in the "public" domain.'
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trigger the kind of 'disclosure creep' that would inevitably occur if the 'general
honesty-probity' argument were a ground for the lawful disclosure of private facts
and infonnation more generally.
I now tum to consider non-elected public officials, and to what extent the law can
provide meaningful protection of their ptivacy interests whilst confolll1ing to the
Constitution.
II NON-ELECTED PuBLIC OFFICIALS
A Who Are 'Non-Elected Public Officials '?
This part of the al1icle will to seek outline the possible scope and content of a legal
right to personal ptivacy for non-elected public officials in Australia. However,
before I can do so, I must first identify who those persons are. The public-ptivate
divide in law, and the administration of public affairs more generally, is anything
but clear-cut - with govemments increasingly willing to 'contract out' a range of
their functions to the private sector. The contemporary reality is that the same
person or institution may perform a mixture of public and ptivate roles.
Some assistance may be gleaned from the United States, where the Supreme COUl1
and lower coul1s have considered this difficult issue in the context of applying the
New York Times defamation rule. They have had to consider the extent to which the
First Amendment limits the ability of 'public officials' to recover for defamation. 7o
The leading Supreme COUl1 decision said that public officials are, 'at the very least
... those among the hierarchy of govemment employees who have, or appear to the
public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of
govemmental affairs.' 71 The lower courts have, for example, found that a police
officer,72 a principal of a public school 73 and a state prosecutor74 were all public
officials. To define public official in these relatively broad terms in the context of
delineating the scope of the New York Times defamation rule promotes the
underlying 'robust and wide-open public debate' rationale of the First Amendment.
As Erwin Chemerinsky has noted, this makes good sense:
[F]or any govemment employee, even at the lowest rung of the hierarchy, it is
possible that issues could arise conceming their performance on the job and
thus be of impol1ance to the public. 75
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See generally Elwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law (2nd ed, 2005) 1284-9.
Rosenblall v Baer, 383 US 75, 85 (1966) (Brennan J).
McKinlay v Baden, 777 F 2d 1017 (5 th Cir, 1985).
Slel'el7.~ v Tillman, 855 F 2d 394 (th Cir, 1988).
Crane I' Ari=ona Republic, 972 F 2d 1511 (9th Cir, 1992).
Chelllerinsky, above n 70, 1288.
(2008) 29 Adelaide Law Review 193
The animating constitutional principle at work here is that the public will always
have a legitimate interest in the pelj'ormance of those persons - from senior
members of the executive right tlu'ough to low-level govemment employees -
entrusted with and involved in the exercise of functions of a public nature. And as [
will explain in more detail below, it is my view that this constitutional principle is
equally applicable to the administration of govemment in Australia. it will,
therefore, inform the extent to which non-elected public officials can enjoy a right
to personal privacy under the Constitution.
In any event, the High COlllt in Lange also made some pettinent observations as to
what constitutes the executive branch of govemment that may assist in clarifying
who are 'public officials' in an Australian (privacy) context. In seeking to delineate
what amounts to 'political and govenunental communication' for the purpose of the
implied freedom, the Court wrote:
[T]hose [constitutional] provisions which prescribe the system of responsible
government necessarily imply a limitation on legislative and executive power
to deny the electors and their representatives information concerning the
conduct of the executive branch of government throughout the life of a federal
Parliament. Moreover, the conduct of the executive branch is not confined to
Ministers and the public service. It includes the affairs ofstatutol:v authorities
and public utilities which are obliged to report to the legislature or to a
Minister who is responsible to the legislature. In British Steel II Granada
Television, Lord Wilberforce said that it was by these reports that effect was
given to '[t]he legitimate interest of the public' in knowing about the affairs of
such bodies. 76
This passage, and the italicised patt in patticular, provides a good definitional
framework for identifying those persons who may be considered non-elected public
officials in Australia. For example, it would include public servants, Crown
prosecutors, teachers and administrators in public educational institutions, members
of the police force and all other statutory bodies. Moreover, as I will explain
shottly, the reason why these persons are properly considered 'public officials' in
the Australian system of govemment also provides the constitutional justification
for why, and when, the public have a legitimate interest in the disclosure of private
facts and information conceming them.
B The Intersection Behveen the Constitution and the Privacy Interests
ofNon-Elected Public Officials
As noted in Patt II, to enable 'the people to exercise a free and informed choice as
electors',77 the Constitution secures 'access by the people to relevant information
about the functioning of govemment in Australia and aboLlt the policies of political
76
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Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 561 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
Ibid 560.
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patties and candidates for election.' 78 This reflects the fact that the Constitution
provides not only for representative but also responsible govemment; that is, that
the executive govemment is ultimately responsible to the democratically elected
Parliament. As the High COUlt made clear in Lange, it is in this regard that the
public has a legitimate constitutional interest in knowing about the conduct and
affairs of the executive branch of govenunent and those 'of statutory auth01;ties and
public utilities which are obliged to repott to the legislature or to a Minister who is
responsible to the legislature. ,79 It therefore follows that the public will always have
a c011"elative constitutional interest in the pelformance of those persons (that is,
non-elected public officials) tlu'ough whom the executive branch of govenunent -
as defined in Lange - operates.
If so, that legitimate public interest must include the disclosure of private facts and
infonnation conceming non-elected public officials that may diminish their
capacity to properly pelform their public duties. It is in this context that the
Constitution intersects with the ptivacy interests of non-elected public officials. I
now tum to consider those circumstances in which this constitutional rationale may
justify disclosure of these otherwise legally protected private matters.
C The Right to Personal Privacy ofNon-Elected Public Officials in Australia
It was argued earlier that two rationales justify disclosure of private facts and
information regarding elected public officials. To recall, they are when these private
matters either demonstrate the insincerity or hypocrisy of the officials' stated policy
agenda, or demonstrate that the officials' capacities to properly perform their public
duties may be diminished. And though I rejected as a third rationale that their
private behaviour may reflect poorly on their honesty and probity more generally,
the one qualification to this was when it forms the basis of a criminal conviction.
For similar reasons, I would endorse that qualification for non-elected public
officials as well.
However, as the public officials of present concem do not run for elected office, the
circumstances in which there is a public interest in the disclosure of matters
conceming their private lives will necessarily be more limited. Most relevantly,
non-elected public officials do not have to promulgate or rely upon a stated policy
agenda for their position or in order to properly discharge their public duties.
Indeed, for many of them - public servants in palticular - it is anathema. 8o The
upshot is that the first 'hypocritical policy agenda' rationale - which justified, for
example, the disclosure of the homosexual behaviour of politicians who promote a
conservative sexual and family values agenda - is not relevant to non-elected
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See, eg, Public Sen/ice Act 1999 (Cth) s I O( I )(a), which says: 'the Australian Public
Service is apolitical, performing its functions in an impartial and professional
manner.'
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public officials. And, as my analysis in Pmt [ demonstrated, it is difficult to justify
the disclosure of a person's sexuality on any other rationale. Consequently, there is
unlikely ever to be a legitimate public interest in the disclosure of the sexuality of a
non-elected public official; an impOltant point to which I shall return shottly.
1 When private facts and information regarding non-elected public officials may
diminish their capacity to discharge their public duties
It is only on this rationale that the privacy interests of non-elected public officials
may be tnllnped. The public has a legitimate - and constitutional - interest in the
disclosure of private facts and information concerning non-elected public officials
that may diminish their capacity to properly perfonn their public duties. [n
principle, this disclosure rationale would - indeed must - apply to all non-elected
public officials, regardless of their seniority in or impOItance to the executive
branch of government and the administration of public affairs. [n reality, however,
there will be little (if any) interest in, and pressure from, the public (and therefore
the media) to have disclosed infonnation concerning, for example, the private drug
use or poor health of a low-ranking public servant or public school teacher. But the
lack of interest from the public on such private matters in these less impOltant
contexts does not mean there is no legitimate public interest in their disclosure.
Interestingly, it demonstrates that what is in the 'public interest' is not necessarily
of interest to the public: the well-known privacy aphorism noted earlier can cut both
ways.St
[n any event, as it covers all non-elected public officials, this rationale would, for
example, justify the disclosure of infonnation regarding the alcoholism of a foreign
diplomat or the serious ill health of a university Vice-Chancellor. These are private
matters that may diminish the physical or psychological capacity of these non-
elected public officials to properly discharge their public duties. It would also cover
the private use of illicit recreational drugs by a member of the police force and the
infidelity of a public school teacher when his or her lover was a student. [n these
instances the private behaviour undettaken fundamentally betrays, if not breaks, the
solemn public trust placed in those persons who perform these specific public roles.
[n this regard, the public has a right to expect that members of the police force
themselves obey the laws which they swear to uphold and that high school teachers
never abuse the relationship of trust and power they have with and over their
students. When the private behaviour of police officers and schoolteachers ruptures
the public trust that is integral and essential to their positions, then the capacity of
these non-elected public officials to perform their duties is seriously compromised
- if not destroyed.
81 That aphorism - '[w]hat interests the public is not necessarily in the public interest'
- was recently noted in Ash v McKenl1itt [2007] 3 WLR 194. 216 (Buxton LJ).
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It is, however, difficult to think of a context in which, on this rationale, it is ever in
the public interest to disclose infonnation regarding the sexuality of a non-elected
public official. There may once have been an argument that disclosing the
homosexuality of a member of the Australian Defence Force was justified on tllis
rationale, and therefore in the public interest, when there was a prohibition on gays
and lesbians serving in the nlilitary. But the Australian govemment removed this
ban in 1992, so that heterosexuality is no longer a legal pre-requisite for defence
service.82 It calmot, therefore, be argued that the homosexuality of military
persOlmel depJives them of the legal capacity to properly perform their public
duties. There are, of course, sections of the commUllity that consider homosexuality
to be morally wrong and physiologically perverse. They may well, as a
consequence, object in pJinciple to homosexuals being schoolteachers or members
of the police or defence forces, for example. But if the reality that some members of
the public will always morally condenm a person's sexuality is enough to justify
disclosure of that private fact (or any other for that matter), then the law will prove
incapable of providing any meaningful protection of the privacy interests of non-
elected public officials. It must, therefore, be rejected as a ground for disclosure lest
the 'public interest' defence in this context operates to swallow the plivacy rule.
I now tum to consider the privacy interests of another category of public official:
judges. They are also not elected, but perfonn a constitutional role within the
judicial rather than the executive branch of the Australian govemment. The distinct
nature of the public function perfonned by judges and their quite different
relationship to the system of constitutional govemment established by the
Constitution makes it appropriate to undeltake this privacy analysis separate from
the species of non-elected public officials just considered.
III JUDGES
A general privacy rule of the kind proposed by the ALRC would also provide
judges with legal protection on matters for which there exists a reasonable
expectation of privacy. As with election candidates and non-elected public officials,
the key question is, then, when a defence ought to be available to make lawful the
public disclosure of facts and information conceming a judge's sexuality, infidelity,
health or drug use. However, in order to do so, the relationship between the
Constitution and the privacy interests of judges must first be asceltained.
A The Intersection Between the Constitution and the Privacy Interests ofJudges
There is celtainly a constitutional dimension to the question of the extent to which
the privacy interests of judges can be afforded meaningful legal protection in
Australia. However, as the following passage from McHugh J in APLA Ltd v Legal
82 See Justin Healey (ed), Sexualizv and Discrimination (2002) 3, 18-9.
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Services Commissioner (NSWl3 makes clear, the application of the implied
freedom to the judiciary is quite different and more circumscribed compared with
the legislative and executive arms of government:
Discussion of the appointment or removal of judges, the prosecution of
offences. the withdrawal of charges, the provision of legal aid and the funding
of courts. for example, are communications that attract the Lange freedom.
That is because they concern, express~v or inferentially, acts or omissions of
the legislature or the Execlltive Government. They do not lose the freedom
recognised in Lange because they also deal with the administration of justice
in federal jurisdiction. However, communications conceming the results of
cases or the reasoning or conduct of the judges who decide them are not
ordinarily within the Lange freedom. 84
That important constitutional proposition enjoys State Supreme Court support,85
though some commentators,86 and even a judge of the Federal Court, have
questioned its logic and cOlTectness. 87 What it means in a privacy context is that the
private behaviour of judges may be relevant in 'a constitutional sense when it forms
palt of the '[d]iscussion of the appointment or removal ofjudges,.88 I will return to
and expand upon this rationale shOltly.
In any event, the implied freedom does not presently extend to 'communications
concerning the results of cases or the reasoning or conduct of the judges who decide
them,.89 That is, the administration of judicial power (by judges) is not
constitutionally relevant in the same way as it is for the administration of legislati ve
and executive power by elected and non-elected public officials in Australia.
The distinction between communications conceming the administration of justice
that are within the Lange freedom and those that are not may sometimes appear to
be altificial. But it is a distinction that atises from the origins of the constitutional
implication conceming freedom of communication on political and govemment
matters. The Lange freedom arises from the necessity to promote and protect
representative and responsible govemment ... COUlts and judges and the exercise of
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judicial power are not themselves subjects that are involved in representative or
responsible govemment in the constitutional sense.90
Interestingly, this more limited application of the implied freedom to the judicial
ann of govemment may in fact prove a blessing for the privacy rights of laypersons
who become involved in the judicial process. For example, consider that in two of
the Amelican privacy cases considered earlier (Cox and Florida Star) the palties
seeking (unsuccessfully) to asselt their common law right to personal privacy were
victims of serious climes. The United States Supreme Comt applied the New York
Times free speech rationale when considering the relationship between the First
Amendment and American privacy law. That rationale sought to constitutionally
guarantee the public discourse required for meaningful self-govemment. But the
constitutional conception of 'govemment' atticulated by the Supreme Court in Cox
and Florida Star quite clearly covers the judicial ann of govemment:
Without the information provided by the press most of us and many of our
representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on
the administration of govemment generally. With respect to judicial
proceedings in particular, the function of the press serves to guarantee the
faimess of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny
upon the admin istration of justice.91
The upshot is that Amelican law cannot protect the plivacy interests of persons
once they became involved in the judicial process. This is due to the constitutional
logic of disclosure that, according to the Supreme COUlt, is required by the First
Amendment to scrutinise the proceedings of govel11ment, including the
administration ofjustice.
The implied freedom does not extend to the judicial arm of the Australian
govenunent in the same way. Consequently, Australian law is capable of providing
meaningful protection of the privacy interests of persons who become involved in
the judicial process. This may prove significant in the development of Australian
privacy law. As my earlier analysis of the trilogy of American privacy cases
inferentially demonstrates, once 'communications concel11ing the COUltS or judges
or the exercise of judicial power,92 fall within a constitutional conception of free
speech, then the 'obliteration' of the privacy interests of any person drawn into that
judicial process will inevitably follow. Moreover, the effective demise of American
privacy law mOre generally suggests that, were it to endorse this constitutional
conception of 'free speech' and 'govel11ment', the High COUlt would risk triggering
a 'disclosure creep' that may similarly doom the emerging right to personal privacy
in Australia.
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As is the case with non-elected public officials, the fact that judges are not elected
makes the first ('hypocritical policy agenda') disclosure rationale irrelevant in this
context. Indeed, the proper discharge of their judicial duties requires that judges do
not have or seek to advance a stated policy agenda, but do justice to all according to
law.93 However, as noted, the private behaviour of judges is relevant in a
constitutional sense when it forms Palt of the political discussion regarding their
appointment or removal. I now tum to consider the circumstances in which the
disclosure of the sexuality, infidelity, health or drug use of a judge or candidate for
judicial office is constitutionally justified.
I The constitutional relevance ofprivate behaviour to the appointment ofjudges by
the executive government
It is certainly possible that the private behaviour of a person who is a candidate for
judicial office is relevant to the executive's decision as to whether he or she should
be appointed or not. But it seems to me that only the second rationale - when the
private matters (sought to be) disclosed may diminish his or her capacity to
discharge his or her public duties - justifies disclosure in the appointment context.
Consequently, the disclosure of a judge's sexuality or infidelity cannot be justified
on this rationale, in my view. Of course some people consider homosexuality and
infidelity to be morally wrong and would prefer to have judges whose private
behaviour is in hannony with their own conception of an ethical life. But if that
possibility - that an adverse moral judgment about a judge's private life may be
made by some patts of the citizemy - were enough to justify disclosure of
othelwise private matters, then the right to personal privacy of a candidate for
judicial office would be quickly and forever eviscerated. Moreover, and more
impOltantly, these private facts alone do not diminish the capacity of a person to
properly discharge judicial duties. Indeed, to suggest that the disclosure of the
sexuality of a judicial candidate is justified because that personal quality may
impair his or her capacity to properly discharge his or her judicial duties is itself
both morally dubious and legally discriminatory. 94
The most relevant private facts in this regard would be the health or drug use of a
judicial candidate. It would, for example, be constitutionally j lIstified to disclose
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that a candidate was addicted to prescription drugs95 or suffered from a debilitating
physical or mental iIIness. 96 These are personal facts that may diminish a person's
capacity to properly discharge their judicial duties and are relevant, then, to whether
they are fit for judicial appointment by the executive govemment. And I would
argue that disclosure is also justified if a judicial candidate had used recreational
drugs such as marijuana or cocaine whilst a lawyer: 97 not because such private
behaviour would necessarily diminish his or her capacity to perfonll the judicial
role, but because it is clearly relevant to the issue of whether a person who takes
illicit drugs whilst an officer of the comt is a fit and proper person for judicial
appointment.
The situation is, however, arguably different if the past illicit drug use by a judicial
candidate occUlTed whilst he or she was, for example, a university student. In most
cases, this would not impair his or her present capacity to properly discharge a
judicial role and it was not done at a time when the person owed an allegiance to
the legal profession and to the court to which he or she was admitted to practise. Its
disclosure is not, then, constitutionally justified in my view. The one qualification
that I would add to this is, again, if the past drug use by a judicial candidate was the
subject of a criminal conviction. This must also go the question of whether he or
she is a fit and proper person to be appointed to judicial office.
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2 The constitutional relevance ofprivate behaviour to the removal ofjudges by the
executive government
The arguments made above regarding the constitutional relevance of the sexuality,
infidelity, health and drug use of a judicial candidate would seem logically to apply
to judges in the context of removal. But this follows only if the private matters
relevant to the political discussion as to whether a person should be appointed to
judicial office are equally relevant to the removal of a judge. That may tum on the
grounds upon which ajudge can be removed.
In Australia, there are two accepted grounds for the removal of a judge: 'proved
misbehaviour' and 'incapacity ,.98 The definition of 'proved misbehaviour' has been
elusive. But one reasonably broad constmction is that it means 'such misconduct,
whether criminal or not, and whether or not displayed in the actual exercise of
judicial functions, as, being morally wrong, demonstrates the unfitness for office of
the judge in question. ,99 On the other hand, 'incapacity' refers to 'physical or
mental impainnent which would be of such a nature or duration as to watTant
removal.' 100 In the latter case in particular it might, for example, be argued that for
the ill health of a judge to constitute 'incapacity' it must satisfy a higher threshold
of seriousness than is otherwise the case for the health of a judicial candidate to be
relevant in the political discussion regarding their appointment. That might strictly
be tme. And, if so, it would be more difficult to justify constitutionally the
disclosure of cettain private matters once a person was appointed to the bench.
Consequently, judges may enjoy a greater degree of personal privacy than
candidates for judicial office.
However, though the constitutional justification for disclosure in the judicial
context is to secure the political communication (on possible judicial appointments
and removals) necessary to ensure that the citizenry can make infonned voting
choices, there is an important additional reason why these private matters - when
they concemjudicial candidates and judges - ought to be in the public domain. As
Sir Gerard Brennan has rightly noted, '[h]igh standards of judicial conduct are
rightly expected by the community, for public confidence in the COUtts and Judges
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is essential to their authority and therefore essential to the rule of law.' 101 And those
standards ofjudicial conduct must apply 'both in and out of COUlt' .102
It is imperative that public confidence in a judge's ability to perform judicial
duties properly be maintained, for it is public confidence which sustains the
independence of the judiciary.l03
If this is so, then the public has a right to know about private matters that may
diminish the capacity of a judicial candidate or a judge to properly discharge their
his or her duties. The private facts and infonnation relevant to the appointment and
removal of judges are, then, the same. But in the removal context it is the
Constitution and the need to maintain public confidence in the COUltS that provides
the justification for their disclosure.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this alticle was to outline a theoretical framework to underpin and
infonn the development of the emerging right to personal privacy in Australia. In
this regard my focus was public officials in Australia - both elected and unelected
- and the extent to which it is possible for the law to provide them with
meaningful privacy protection under the Constitution.
In order to do so, it was first necessary to explain how a privacy right in Australia
- whether developed by the common law or recognised in statute - must be
compatible with the implied right to freedom of political conullunication recognised
by the Constitution. This was done in Palt I in relation to 'elected public officials',
and my analysis demonstrated that the intersection between the Constitution and
their privacy interests is a complex one. Indeed, the extent to which the law can
protect their personal pJivacy will tum on what conception of the implied freedom
one holds. I argued that it was consistent with the Constitution for the law to protect
facts and infonnation for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy such as
a person's sexuality, infidelity, health or drug use.
This kind of privacy rule - which the Australian Law Reform Commission has
recently recommended that the Commonwealth enact into federal law 104 - can,
from a constitutional perspective, apply to elected public officials. The conception
of the implied freedom that I favour recognises that providing elected public
officials with meaningful privacy protection may encourage meritorious candidates
to stand for public office and enhance the quality of public discourse on political
and governmental matters. Moreover, my analysis of the intersection between the
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First Amendment and American privacy rules suggests that if elected public
officials enjoy no legally enforceable zones of person privacy, then the disclosure
logic that underpins this constitutional relationship may well plant the seeds of
destruction of the emerging right to personal privacy more generally.
There is also no reason in principle to expect or demand that people who seek
public office must sun-ender their privacy completely and for all time. The
impottant interests and values that a privacy right fosters - most notably the
promotion of human dignity and flourishing - are common to and valued by us all.
It is, however, true that for such a privacy rule to conform to the Constitution that
protection cannot be absolute for elected public officials. It must yield in circum-
stances where disclosure of private facts and infonnation is necessary to provide the
citizenry with the infonnation needed to make free and infonned voting choices. In
this regard, I argued that disclosing the sexuality, infidelity, health or drug use of
elected public officials was constitutionally justified if it would demonstrate the
insincerity or hypocrisy of their policy agenda or if it would diminish their capacity
to properly discharge their public duties.
I then turned to consider the possible scope and content of a legal tight to personal
privacy under the Constitution for 'non-elected public officials' and 'judges'. This
was undettaken in Palts 1I and III respectively. My analysis demonstrated that the
implied freedom intersects with the privacy interests of 'non-elected public
officials' in a manner similar to their 'elected' counterpatts, but has a more limited
constitutional dimension for 'judges'. It was also observed that, as 'non-elected
public officials' and 'judges' do not run for public office, the public interest in the
disclosure of their private facts and infonllation will necessatily be more limited.
Indeed, it was argued that disclosure is only justified if these private matters may
diminish their capacity to properly discharge their public duties. This disclosure
rationale is compelled by the implied freedom for both 'non-elected public
officials' and 'judges', with the need to maintain public confidence in the integrity
of the courts an additional justification in the judicial context.
As noted above, the ALRC considers that '[i]n the absence of a statutory cause of
action, the common law in this area will continue to develop.' 105 Australian law in
this regard is increasingly attentive to and cognisant of the impottance and value of
protecting 'the interests of the individual in leading, to some reasonable extent, a
secluded and ptivate life'. 106 But a legal rule of this kind must confonll to the
Constitution. In this article [ have developed a theory as to the relationship between
the implied freedom and the privacy interests of public officials in Australia. My
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account suggests that it is possible to provide them (and all Australians) with
meaningful protection of their personal privacy without depriving the citizemy of
the political and govemmental infonnation needed to make free and informed
voting choices. The interests of ptivacy and constitutional govemment in Australia
are by no means at odds. To secure the latter at the expense of the fom1er would be
a pYIThic victory indeed. The law must seek to identify and jealously guard those
zones of personal privacy that are the core of individual identity and source of
human dignity. For that too is manifestly in the public interest.
